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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JERROD PORTMAN, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
 
          NO. 37499 
 
 
 
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Portman failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either 
by imposing a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea 
to lewd conduct with a child under 16, or by relinquishing jurisdiction? 
 
 
Portman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
  In November 2008, 21-year-old Portman twice engaged 14-year-old A.W. in 
unwanted sexual intercourse.  (PSI, pp.1-2.)  Afterward, he took A.W.’s bra and tacked 
it up on the wall above his bed next to the undergarments of other females that he had 
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“had intercourse with.”  (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.8; PSI attachments, pp.10-11, 21.)  
Also in November 2008, Portman supplied 15-year-old K.M. with beer, drove her to a 
deserted area, and, after she had vomited due to intoxication, Portman grabbed K.M.'s 
neck and forced her to perform oral sex on him.  (PSI attachments, pp.22-23.)  Portman 
took K.M.’s necklace and hung it from his rear view mirror.  (PSI attachments, p.23.)   
Portman left bruises on K.M.’s neck “from where he forced her to [perform] oral sex” and 
wrote “something to the effect of ‘Jerrod was here’” on her breast with a Sharpie pen.  
(PSI attachments, p.27.)   
The state charged Portman with two counts of lewd conduct with a chilled under 
16.  (R., pp.26-29, 31-32.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Portman pled guilty to one 
count and the state dismissed the second count.  (R., pp.36, 38-42.)  The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.53-56.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district 
court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.67-69.)  Portman filed a notice of appeal timely 
from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.76-77, 83-86.)  He also filed a timely Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.71, 79.)  
Portman asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his age, childhood, status 
as a first-time felon, and purported remorse.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)  The record 
supports the sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
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fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.    
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the 
seriousness of the offense, Portman’s failure to accept full responsibility for his criminal 
conduct, the danger he presents to the community, and his lack of amenability to 
community-based sex offender treatment.  Although the instant offense constitutes 
Portman’s first felony conviction, his criminal record includes two juvenile adjudications, 
in addition to adult convictions for dispensing liquor to minors, disturbing the peace 
(amended from petit theft), and attempted petit theft (reduced from felony criminal 
possession of a financial transaction card).  (PSI, pp.6-7.)  Portman’s history also 
includes several reports of crimes for which he was not prosecuted.  In 2003, he 
admitted that he had stolen $300 cash from a flight attendant’s purse while a flight was 
in progress, although he claimed he “flushed [it] down the toilet” and, pursuant to his 
mother’s agreement to pay restitution, no charges were filed.  (PSI attachments, pp.84-
85.)  From January to October 2008, Portman “had numerous overdrawn checks along 
with many letters from various collection agencies,” and, at the time of the psychological 
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evaluation, reported he “still ha[d] ten outstanding checks.”  (Psychosexual Evaluation, 
p.4.)  In September 2008, Portman stole a necklace from an ex-girlfriend’s residence 
and pawned it at a local pawn shop; however, the victim “was reluctant” to pursue theft 
charges and, although Portman was issued a citation for possession of stolen property, 
no further action on the charge appears in the record.  (PSI attachments, pp.96, 98.)  In 
November 2008, Portman’s cousin, Dale, filed a report with law enforcement advising 
that Portman had taken and pawned numerous items from Dale’s residence.  
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p.4; PSI attachments, pp.35-36.)   
Portman’s history also includes numerous reports of inappropriate conduct 
toward adolescent females.  At age 18, Portman admitted to having engaged 14-year-
old K.S. in sexual intercourse.  (PSI attachments, pp.37-39.)  Following his commission 
of the instant offense, officers spoke with Portman’s roommate, Jacob, who reported 
that Portman is “somewhat of a bully” and that he had witnessed Portman “become 
violent” in the past.  (PSI attachments, p.25.)  Jacob told officers that he “believed there 
were other females [Portman] had done this same type of activity with.”  (PSI 
attachments, p.25.)  Officer subsequently interviewed several other adolescent females 
with whom Portman had had contact.  Thirteen-year-old B.T. reported that, while at 
Portman’s residence, Portman “grabbed her by the arm, pushed her into his bedroom 
and pushed her down on the bed.  She stated that she told him ‘no,’ got up and 
attempted to leave the room.  She stated that he pushed her to the bed two or three 
times.”  (PSI attachments, p.45.)  Sixteen-year-old H.S. reported that Portman “asked 
her to go into his bedroom and ‘cuddle and some other stuff.’  [H.S.] told him no and he 
started yelling at her and calling her a[n] ignorant bitch.”  (PSI attachments, p.46.)  H.S. 
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stated that Portman grabbed her arms and pinned her to the wall until “another friend 
stepped in and pushed him away from her.”  (PSI attachments, p.46.)  H.S. also 
reported that a friend of hers, L.M., “was at Mr. Portman’s residence, had been drinking 
and passed out.”  (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.9; PSI attachments, p.46.)  H.S. advised 
that Portman attempted to have intercourse with L.M. while she was unconscious, but 
“[H.S.] and others stopped him.”  (PSI attachments, p.46.)  Furthermore, prior to 
Portman’s sentencing hearing for the instant offense, Portman was charged with 
communication with a minor for immoral purposes and residential burglary with sexual 
motivation in Asotin County.  (Tr., p.41, Ls.13-18.)  Officers concluded that “Portman is 
believed to be predatory in nature.  This is based on the information of the ‘trophies’ 
[various females’ undergarments that were hung on his wall] that were found to be in 
Portman’s possession.”  (PSI attachments, p.23.)   
The psychosexual evaluator determined that Portman scored in the “moderate 
range, possibly toward the higher end, for sexual re-offending,” and stated that 
Portman’s “behaviors are predatory in nature and most likely would have continued had 
he not been arrested.”  (Psychosexual Evaluation, pp.13-14.)  The psychosexual 
evaluator concluded: 
At this time Mr. Portman is not amenable to any sort of outpatient 
sexual offender treatment.  His attitudes and behaviors during the 
assessment process are good predictors how he would handle a 
treatment program. In all likelihood he would not meet his financial 
obligations for treatment nor take an open and sincere approach to this.  
Factors associated with a poor prognosis include his age, an antisocial 
orientation, and the heavy reliance on projection and denial.  It is also 
anticipated he will display similar characteristics with a probation officer.  
There is a good probability he would soon become a ‘management 
problem’ for them.  Mr. Portman has not really had any serious 
consequences for his prior criminal behaviors, both in adolescence and 
adulthood.  He may believe there is not going to be any serious 
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consequence for this offense.  He is not grasping its seriousness nor the 
long term consequences it is going to have for him.  Somehow this needs 
to be stressed to him if he ever expects to deal with his sexual abuse in a 
realistic manner.   
 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p.14.)  The presentence investigator recommended that 
Portman “be sentenced to a period of incarceration,” noting that Portman “minimized his 
actions by placing blame on the victim and went as far as stating he felt used by the 
victim,” and: 
It would appear that Mr. Portman has shown a pattern of preying on young 
girls and providing them with alcohol in order to take advantage of them 
sexually.   
 
 Due to Mr. Portman’s lack of empathy and responsibility for his 
action, in addition to his lack of follow through with the presentence and 
psychosexual evaluation process, Mr. Portman remains to be a threat to 
the community.  It does not appear that probation or treatment within the 
community is appropriate at this time and until Mr. Portman is willing to 
accept total responsibility for his actions he is not amenable to sex 
offender treatment.   
 
(PSI, pp.15-16.)  At sentencing, the district court stated, “Mr. Portman, what these folks 
are telling me is that you’re not a candidate for probation at this point in time.”  (Tr., 
p.47, Ls.1-3.)  The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence, showing leniency by granting Portman the opportunity to 
participate in the retained jurisdiction program.  The sentence imposed is appropriate in 
light of Portman’s failure to accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct, the danger 
he presents to the community, and his lack of amenability to community-based 
treatment.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Portman has failed to establish an 
abuse of sentencing discretion.    
Portman next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his purported remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and desire to 
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participate in sex offender treatment.  “Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion 
of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4).  The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within 
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion.  See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); 
State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial 
court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation 
would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 
P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).   
Portman’s conduct in the retained jurisdiction program clearly demonstrated that 
he was not an acceptable candidate for community supervision.  While in the program, 
he received three verbal warnings, five written warnings, three alternative sanctions, 
and a DOR.  (APSI, pp.2-3.)  He also received an incident report for “making derogatory 
comments about another offender’s wife and what he would do to her when he gets 
out.”  (APSI, p.2.)  NICI reported: 
Mr. Portman has continually struggled with the rules at NICI. ... No 
staff, group, or peer interventions have had any impact on his behavior.  If 
anything his behavior has worsened as he has attempted to lie to staff to 
avoid accountability for his actions.  It’s my opinion that he has clearly 
indicated by his behavior that he is unwilling, at this time, to follow the 
rules or comply with staff directives or sanctions.  This also seems to 
indicate he will likely be unwilling to follow the rules if allowed on probation 
in the community. 
 
(APSI, p.3.)  NICI advised that Portman “put minimal effort into his work,” failed to keep 
a daily treatment journal as required, continued to blame the victim, “did not appear to 
have developed any insight or understanding regarding his thinking and was attempting 
to just say what he felt staff wanted to hear,” and did not demonstrate amenability to sex 
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offender treatment.  (APSI, pp.1, 4.)  NICI recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction, stating: 
At this point, I do not feel [Portman] would benefit from treatment in the 
community and would likely continue to refuse to follow the rules and 
would violate the rules and expectations on probation.  In addition, as a 
result of his lack or motivation to change his thinking and behavior I 
believe he is a risk in the community to continue his criminal behavior and 
create additional victims.  Based on this information and his lack of 
progress I do not feel he is amenable to treatment at this time. 
 
(APSI, pp.4-5.)  NICI’s sex offender risk evaluator classified Portman “as a moderate-
high risk for sexual re-offense” and noted that Portman “continues to justify and 
minimize his behavior.  He stated that if he was to go to prison he would blame the NICI 
program for failing him. ... [H]e does not appear to be ready to take responsibility for 
himself and seems to be resistant to the idea that he should have consequences for his 
choices.”  (Sex Offender Risk Assessment, p.3, attached to APSI.)   
Portman has not shown that he was an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision, particularly in light of his elevated risk to reoffend, his abysmal conduct in 
the retained jurisdiction program, and his continued lack of amenability to treatment.  He 
has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction.   
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Portman’s conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
       
 DATED this 2nd day of November, 2010. 
 
 
 
      /s/______________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of November, 2010, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
JORDAN E. TAYLOR 
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      /s/______________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
   
